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CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION IN PATENT LAW:
THE ROLE OF PUBLIC GOOD IN DEFINING THE LIMITS
OF PATENT EXCLUSIVITY
SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN*
In light of the recent outrageous price-spiking of pharmaceuticals, this Article
questions the underlying justifications for exclusive rights conferred by the grant
of a patent. Traditionally, patents are defined as property rights granted to
encourage desirable innovation. This definition is a misfit as treating patents as
property rights does a poor job of defining the limits of the patent rights as well
as the public benefit goals of the system. This misfit gradually caused an
imbalance in the rights versus duties construct within patent law. After a
thorough analysis of the historical and philosophical perspectives of patent
exclusivity, this Article concludes that the extent of exclusivity that patent
monopoly currently bestows is unsupported by the philosophy of patent exclusivity
that asserts strong public benefits. Alternatively, this Article presents the law of
contracts as embodying a framework within which patent law can fit better. By
viewing the grant of a patent as a contract with the government in exchange for
the patent holder providing a benefit to society, patent owners shall have duties to
the society that correspond to their rights under the patent.

* Srividhya Ragavan serves as a Professor of Law at the Texas A&M University School of
Law. She is the author of the monograph PATENTS AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES, Oxford University Press, 2012. She has also co-published (with Irene Calboli)
DIVERSITY IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: IDENTITIES, INTERESTS AND INTERSECTIONS, with
Cambridge University Press, 2015. The author acknowledges that the paper has benefitted from
thoughtful comments of several colleagues and wishes to thank Professors Peter Yu, Jay Kesan,
Peter Lee, Saurabh Vishnubakth, Sarah Burstein, Timothy Holbrook and Stephen Henderson for
their thoughtful comments. A special thanks to Mr. Erwin Cartwright for his work inputs on the
paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Of all the thieves, robbers, murderers and rapists, one man emerged the
“most hated man in America” in the year 2015. That man was Martin Shkreli, the
Chief Executive of Turing Pharmaceuticals, and his infamy was a direct reaction to
raising the price of Daraprim, a generic drug originally developed in the 1950s, by
5000%.1 Although the patent on the Turing drug had expired, the price of
pharmaceuticals in patent monopoly contexts continues to represent a significant
international debate. The price of pharmaceuticals is an important election issue in
the United States. In January 2016, fifty Democratic members of the House, led by
Representative Lloyd Doggett of Texas, urged government agencies to consider
diluting or diminishing the exclusive rights over patents on pharmaceuticals.2
While the pharmaceutical industry denounced reductions in patent exclusivity as
arbitrary on the grounds that they would stifle innovation, non-governmental
organizations and the public seemed broadly in favor.3 At the center of this debate
is the role of the exclusivity conferred by the grant of a patent. Contemporary
issues involving patent law have struggled to define the limits of patent exclusivity
1

Zakir Thomas, Martin Shkreli: The Man of the (Pharma) Year 2015, SPICYIP (Jan. 15,
2016), http://spicyip.com/2016/01/guest-post-martin-shkreli-the-man-of-the-pharma-year-2015.
html.
2
Kimberly Leonard, Can the Government Already Control Drug Prices?, U.S. NEWS (Jan. 11,
2016), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2016/01/11/congressional-democrats-urge-nih-toact-on-drug-prices.
3
Id.
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in the context of addressing the ability of patents to deliver the purported objective
of public benefit. The effect of patent trolls on innovation, access to essential
medicines, and exclusive rights on basic research tools are a mere sample of issues
that have raised doubts regarding the patent system’s ability to serve its
preordained promise of public benefit.4 In all, the quest for a patent system that
serves to encourage desirable innovation without imposing undue social cost is
ongoing, and its end remains elusive.
Traditionally, scholarly discussions on the limits of patent exclusivity posit
patents in functional terms. That is, patents are defined as property rights granted
to encourage desirable innovation. The system was designed to capture the
objective of enhancing public benefit by incentivizing creativity without imposing
undue social cost. However, positing patent law within the property framework has
been used to support a notion that the patent system is functioning to ultimately
achieve its objectives.5 Scholars and even courts rely on a property rhetoric to
sustain the patent system.6 Generally, the property based conception of patents has
had the laudatory impact of working towards a system that results in more patents,
which is decoded as more innovation, which, in turn, is discerned as an increase in
public benefit.7 Such a perception of patents has beneficially encapsulated patent
law with the appealing sheen of producing public benefit.8
4

See Electronic Frontier Foundation: Defending Your Rights in the Digital World, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/resources-patent-troll-victims (last visited Sept. 2,
2016); see also James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurt-innova
tion. See generally Robert L. Stoll, Patent Trolls: Friend or Foe, WIPO MAGAZINE (Apr. 2014),
http://www.wipo.int/wipo_magazine/en/2014/02/article_0007.html; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
5
See William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY, 168, 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001); Horne v. Dept. of
Agric., 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2441-43 (2015) (holding that the Takings Clause imposes a “categorical
duty” on the government to pay just compensation whether it takes personal or real property,
thereby overruling the Ninth Circuit, which had previously held that personal property receives
less protection under the Takings Clause than real property); see also Adam Mossoff, Patents as
Constitutional Private Property: The Historical Protection of Patents Under the Takings Clause,
87 B.U. L. REV. 689, 689 (2007).
6
Id.
7
See, e.g., Harold Wegner, China Leads Top Five Patent Filing Countries, LAIPLA (Mar. 13,
2016), http://www.laipla.net/china-leads-top-five-patent-filing-countries/; see also Jason
Rantanen, US Patent Application Filings for FY 2015, PATENTLYO (Oct. 15, 2016),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/10/patent-application-filings.html.
8
See John C. Stedman, Invention and Public Policy, 12 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBS. 649, 64979 (1947); see also David Kestenbaum, Evaluating The Benefits And Costs Of Patents,
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This paper asserts that patent law is a misfit within the traditional property
regime. That is, the prevailing notions of patents as an extension of property rights
lead one to construe patents in terms of rights rather than obligations. Property law
posits rights in correlative terms and thus, defines rights from the perspective of
the duty of third parties. Thus, acquisition of patent rights signals a societal duty to
forbear from the patented invention. However, the property-based construct of
patents does a poor job of defining the limits of the rights. As such, patent law
lacks a clear outline or measure of the patent owner’s duties corresponding to the
rights.
For instance, property regimes, rarely, if ever, provide for absolute
ownership. While Blackstone may have touted an Englishman’s “sole and despotic
dominion” over his land, ownership over real property is regularly subject to public
interests.9 Eminent domain and government regulations over private property serve
as examples of how public interests limit private property. Thus, in real property
law, the components of ownership and the ensuing exclusivity have clear limits
and are tied to the larger goals of establishing societal orderliness. In contrast,
contemporary patent law struggles with defining the outer limits of patent
exclusivity.10 Importantly, over time, it has resulted in a lack of correlation or
proportionality between exclusive rights and the public benefit goals it seeks to
achieve.11 For example, a patent owner has limited duties in return for acquiring
the exclusionary rights. The patent owner has no direct duty towards securing the
end of public benefit, save for the disclosure. The patent mechanism does not
clearly define whether, and if so, when, public interest considerations supersede
the private rights of the patent owner. For example, a pharmaceutical patent owner
does not have a duty to institute access-enabling mechanisms.12 Even during a
NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 17, 2014), http://www.npr.org/2014/07/17/332205119/evaluating
-the-benefits-and-costs-of-patents (discussing the costs and benefits of patents).
9
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (“[T]he right of property; or that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”).
10
See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 30-70 (2008) (asserting and outlining
the ways in which patent laws do not work well with property rights).
11
See ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 150 (2011) [hereinafter,
JUSTIFYING IP] (discussing the role of proportionality).
12
See 35 U.S.C. § 271; Thomas F. Maffei, The Patent Misuse Doctrine: A Balance of Patent
Rights and the Public Interest, 1 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 178 (1970); see also
Stedman, supra note 8, at 649-79; Jeanne C. Fromer, Should The Law Care Why Intellectual
Property Rights Have Been Asserted?, 32 HOUS. L. REV. 549 (2015).
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public health crisis, a patent owner is not legally obligated to price differentially or
license the patent, voluntarily or compulsorily.13 While patent owners have a duty
to honor a state’s power of eminent domain, the practice of compulsory licensing
has been controversial.14 Thus, under the current structure, the obligation of patent
owners in the context of the larger goals of the system is unclear. A lack of clear
limits, this paper highlights, has caused an imbalance in the rights versus duties
construct within patent law. It has also blurred the lines that define the public
benefit goals of the system.
This shift in rhetoric towards a rights-centric approach has resulted in a more
Blackstonian view of patent protection, causing patent law to move away from the
public benefit goals of the system. Consequently, instrumental elements of the
patent system have coalesced to predominantly protect the inventor. In turn, public
benefit aspects of the system have been relegated to the status of a by-product.
Patent law has long suffered from a lack of a realistic scale to measure its output,
which has led to technical measures such as the number of patents to become
predicates of its outcome. Slowly, patent disclosures increasingly became
perceived as the sole exchange for gaining exclusivity. Disclosure has come to be
treated as the singular constituent element that delivers the objectives of the
system.15 The resulting tendency is to treat quantitative measures – the number of
patents issued – as a proxy for desirable innovation that is presumed to benefit the
public. Consequently, more private property has come to denote more public
benefit. That is perhaps why more patents are generally considered desirable. We
are at a point where scholars, and even courts, express their discontent over the
quality of innovation and disclosures.16
See generally U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.”). Eminent domain has always been an exception to the acquisition
of private property, though the extension of the same principles in patent law has been much
more controversial.
14
Mark W. Lauroesch, General Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: Good in
Theory, But Not Necessarily in Practice, 6 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 41 (1990); see Cole
M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea Whose Time Has Come, 8
NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 666 (1988).
15
See PETER DRAHOS, A PHILOSOPHY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 213 (1996) (explaining
that the term instrumentalism is connected with the doctrine of pragmatism which in law, refers
to the idea of law serving as a tool, although Drahos would define the non-duty based
instrumentalism as outlined in this paper as a form of proprietarianism).
16
See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 1004 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Mayer, J. dissenting) (referring to the
low-threshold for patent eligibility to note that it has resulted in patents ranging from the
somewhat ridiculous to the truly absurd); Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents,
13
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This paper’s main assertion is that the extent of exclusivity that patent
monopoly currently bestows seems unsupported by the doctrinal construct of the
philosophy behind exclusivity.17 Thus, at the outset, the discourse in this paper
outlines the historical as well as the philosophical perspectives of patent
exclusivity. A nuanced observation of the history of patent exclusivity reveals that
the basic doctrinal and normative structure of patent law provides limited
exclusivity focused on achieving the one goal of public benefit. Consequently, the
goal of securing public benefit defines the limits of exclusivity, and by default, the
patent system. That is, public benefit serves as the scale to measure the merits of
the patent system.18 Such a measure directly addresses the obligation of the patent
system and provides an outcome not only addressing the rights in patents, but more
importantly, their limits.
Next, the paper traces the prevailing rights over patents. The discussion
outlines how scholars and courts historically associated patent rights as a means to
achieve two functional ends,19 namely: (i) encouraging or incentivizing innovation
to achieve larger public benefit goals; and (ii) disseminating information through
disclosure.20 Over time, each of these outcomes has come to represent interrelated
functions, regardless of whether they do or not in fact. Disclosure has come to be
85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 641, 667-69 (2011) (asserting that unlike how it is in its current
form, the patent document should be readable to fully perform its teaching function); see also
Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent Used as a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2012, at A14;
Benjamin N. Roin, Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118
HARV. L. REV. 2007 (2005). See generally ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: HOW OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND
PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2002).
17
See David B. Schorr, How Blackstone Became a Blackstonian, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES
IN LAW 103, 104-06 (arguing that Blackstone himself “did not believe that this absolutist and
individualist conception” of property squared with the prevailing British notions of property).
18
See generally GEORGE C. CHRISTIE & PATRICK H. MARTIN, JURISPRUDENCE, TEXT AND
READINGS ON THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW (3d ed. 2007).
19
See Roin, supra note 16; see also Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU
L. REV. 123 (2006); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 227 (2003) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Pfaff
v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (stating that the patent system should be thought of
as “a carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public disclosure of new
and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of
time”); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
20
See Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent
Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 274-300 (1998). See
generally U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARKS OFFICE, THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM:
1790-1952 (1953).
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interrelated with inventive presence to the extent that more disclosure has come to
mean more inventive activities. Slowly, under the contemporary view, securing
patent rights is implicitly considered as satisfying the twin objectives of
encouraging innovation and disseminating information. Such a construct, this
paper asserts, dampens the presence of a duty of the patent owner to society.
Instead, it has posited patent grants largely within a rights paradigm, diluting the
duty requirement of the patent holder. Slowly, the grant of a patent is presumed to
fulfill the corresponding duty to discharge the innovation and dissemination
objectives of the patent system. The realigned rights and duties relationship in its
prevailing form has led to a distorted understanding of patent law divorced from its
social responsibilities. Thus, the absoluteness of the currently prevailing form of
rights over patents, generally attributed as a by-product of association with
property law, is perhaps misguided.21
Last, the paper asserts that the patent owner has a corresponding duty which
arises from the overlay of the law of contracts on underlying patent law theories.
The characteristic feature of contract law, on which intellectual property is heavily
based, imposes corresponding obligations or responsibilities over the rights holder.
The paper draws support from historic and philosophical sources of intellectual
property law to assert that the overlay of the law of contracts on patents cannot be
ignored. Instead, the overlay of the law of contracts is desirable because it can
better tailor patent law to encourage innovation without undue social costs. The
grant of monopoly rights is a contract with the government in exchange for the
patent holder providing a benefit to society. The intrinsic nature of contract law
imposes corresponding obligations on the rights holder. The contract necessarily
balances granted rights with imposed corresponding obligations of the patent
owner. That is, the patent owner would be subject to an obligation in proportion to
the rights granted.22 Such a design would result in public benefit goals inherently
limiting the ambit of patent exclusivity.
The historic role of the exclusivity doctrine, from which Part I of this paper
proceeds, is the obvious starting point to appreciate the role and architecture of the
exclusivity doctrine in the context of the public benefit expectations. Part II
highlights how instrumental elements of the contemporary patent regime have
21

See also Shubha Ghosh, Duty, Consequences, & Intellectual Property, 10 U. ST. THOMAS
L.J. 801 (2013) (noting that the heavy reliance on utilitarianism has resulted in an approach that
measures success based on an aggregated rather than an individualist outcome). Ghosh points out
that a measure of success under the utilitarian theory would consider technical success first, and
consequences second. Id. at 8.
22
See generally MERGES, supra note 11, at 150-51.
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suffered from an acute disconnect with the targeted objectives of the system,
resulting in a rights-centric patent system. Next, Part III defines the ambit of the
correlative duty to delineate the rights and obligations in the background of the
current system. In doing so, Part III examines the kernel of the rights in patents as
well as the source of the duty not to infringe and concludes that patent law needs to
be reoriented from the perspective of the grant in order to achieve the public
benefit objectives.
I
OF EXCLUSIVITY & PUBLIC BENEFIT
This part explores the doctrinal core of patent exclusivity and presents a
historical understanding of the doctrine in terms of its objectives. The historical
orientation of patents is examined in the context of its nexus with the public benefit
obligation. In doing so, the narrative postulates that patent exclusivity can be most
effective when viewed from its ordained public function. Hence, patent exclusivity
is meant to be limited by larger public benefit considerations. Disclosures, while
serving an important role, cannot represent the sole exchange for gaining exclusive
rights.
A. A Historical Overview of the Doctrine of Exclusivity
The core of patent law’s doctrinal and normative structure can best be
elucidated from the writings of Thomas Jefferson.23 In denying a connection
between patent law’s proprietary underpinnings and natural rights, Jefferson
asserts that the exclusive right to the invention is a direct return for the benefit that
the society will derive.24 Jefferson describes the concept of stable ownership as a
mere gift of social law as opposed to a natural right.25 Jefferson indicates that the
exclusive right of the patent owner is not a natural right, but instead is an
encouragement “to pursue ideas which may produce utility but this may or may not
be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without claim or
23

But see Adam Mossoff, Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents?
Reevaluating the Patent Privilege in Historical Context, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (2007).
24
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, No Patents on Ideas (Aug. 13, 1813),
http://www.red-bean.com/kfogel/jefferson-macpherson-letter.html;
Letter
from
Thomas
Jefferson to James Madison (July 31, 1788), in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 476 (Philip B.
Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
25
See Adam D. Moore, A Lockean Theory of Intellectual Property, 21 HAMLINE L. REV. 65,
65 n.5 (1997) (noting that Thomas Jefferson explicitly disavowed any natural-law underpinning
of intellectual property rights).
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complaint from anybody.”26 Thus, benefit to society is the central theme in
Jefferson’s thinking. Jefferson emphasizes the line that segregates items for which
society can suffer “the embarrassment of an exclusive right” from those for which
it cannot.27 For Jefferson, products that can benefit from exclusive rights ought to
be clearly distinguished from those that do not deserve or require such protection,
although he acknowledges the difficulties of the exercise.28 Patent Commissioner
Conway Coe would later rephrase the trade-off as one where “giving the inventor a
limited amount of protection, [it] assures society of the benefits of his genius.”29
Thus the internal core of patent law connects societal benefit to the vested
exclusive rights.30
The inherent dilemmas confronting the rights versus obligation question
were captured by Thomas Jefferson in his letter to Isaac McPherson.31 Jefferson,
himself an inventor and a draftsman of the 1793 Patent Act,32 outlined to
McPherson in 1813 the social and economic rationale of the patent system. 33 He
wrote, “[s]ociety may give an exclusive right to the profits arising from them, as an
encouragement to men to pursue ideas which may produce utility, but this may or
may not be done, according to the will and convenience of the society, without
claim or complaint from anybody.”34 The societal discretion outlined in Jefferson’s
conception of patents creates the impression of a contract, which posits society’s
benefit as the consideration for patent exclusivity.
In his classical treatise on patent law, and like many other scholars after him,
George Curtis defines patents from a contractual standpoint as a “grant by the
government, to the author of a new and useful invention, of the exclusive right, for

26

Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), http://www.let.rug.nl/
usa/presidents/thomas-jefferson/letters-of-thomas-jefferson/jefl220.php [hereinafter Letter to
McPherson].
27
Id.
28
Id. (“Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but for the
benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things which are
worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are not.”).
29
See THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN PATENT SYSTEM: 1790-1952, supra note 20.
30
Id.
31
Letter to McPherson, supra note 26.
32
See P.J. Federico, Operation of the Patent Act of 1790, 18 J. PAT. OFF. SOC. 237, 238
(1936); see also Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 7 (1996).
33
See Graham, 383 U.S. at 7-9.
34
Id. at 37 n.2; see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, VI WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 180-81
(Washington ed. 2013).
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the term of invention, of practicing that invention.”35 The consideration for the
grant, Curtis reflects, “is the benefit to the society resulting from the invention.”36
When viewed through a contract law lens, a patent subjects an inventor to an
obligation to provide benefits to the public in exchange for the public’s refrainment
from the patented invention.
The primacy of the social benefit component of patents has survived to date
and forms an integral part of U.S. patent law. For instance, at a speech delivered
during the Centennial Celebration of the American Patent System in 1891, W.C.
Dodge reiterated that our patent system is based on the idea of primarily
benefitting the public and not the inventor.37 The U.S. Supreme Court endorses the
view that exclusivity is a sufferance self-imposed by society (designed as an award
by the government to the inventor) to generate a larger public good. In Graham,
the Supreme Court echoed Jefferson’s words in holding that “the patent monopoly
was not designed to secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries.
Rather, it was a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”38
Similarly, Margaret Chon argued in 1993 that James Madison, whose thinking had
significant impact on U.S. patent law, subscribed to the view that “the public good
fully coincides with the claims of individuals.”39 Chon discusses how Madison
repeatedly claimed that there is no contradiction between simultaneously
maximizing self-interest and the public good.40 Thus, the social benefit component
of patents seems to have survived contemporary times. In sum, the societal
tolerance of the monopoly is to encourage creation of more innovations that benefit
society, whereas disclosures merely help make the knowledge public. Society will,

35

GEORGE TICKNOR CURTIS, A TREATISE ON THE
IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1 (2d ed. 1854).
36

LAW OF PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS

Id.
James L. Ewin, The Minor Innovations of the Century, in UNITED STATES BICENTENNIAL
COMMEMORATIVE EDITION OF PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES 478 (1892).
38
Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (“The grant of an exclusive right to an invention was the creation of
society – at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas – and was not to be freely given.
Only inventions and discoveries which furthered human knowledge, and were new and useful,
justified the special inducement of a limited private monopoly.”).
39
See Margaret Chon, Postmodern “Progress”: Reconsidering the Copyright and Patent
Power, 43 DEPAUL L. REV. 97, 137-38 (1993); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 43 (James
Madison).
40
Id. at 138.
37
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for its own benefit, bear the correlative duty of tolerating the exclusive right for the
term of the patent.41
B. A Philosophical Perspective of the Exclusivity Doctrine
Against this historical background of the doctrinal core of patent exclusivity,
the philosophy of patent exclusivity, outlined below, further asserts the strong
public benefit underpinnings in this area of the law. The predominant focus was
seemingly on the end objective of the system. This part highlights that whether
from a natural rights, private, or public law perspective, patents were viewed as
fulfilling a social benefit objective. Thus, the narrative postulates that the role of
exclusivity was limited and confined by the larger needs of the society. In doing
so, this section asserts that exclusivity can be most effective when viewed from
such an ordained public function.
The role of public benefit in the context of the awarded exclusive rights has
traditionally resonated as part of the discussions on patents. Captured originally by
Jefferson, the importance of the public benefit end has been reiterated by other
distinguished experts.42 For instance, the Honorable William E. Simonds,
Commissioner of Patents, reasoned that the extent of natural right exclusivity in
intellectual property creations should be subject to limitations such as the principle
of necessity.43 “Each original inventor of an improvement in the useful arts,” he
outlined, “has . . . the same kind of a title to the exclusive enjoyment thereof . . .
.”44 Commissioner Simonds further added, “[w]hile the exclusive natural right to
an invention is a correct thing in theory, its exercise is suppressed through
necessity.”45 Although Simonds considered patents as natural rights (unlike
Jefferson, who posited patent rights as social rights), he nonetheless found that
necessity could circumscribe the extent of the rights. Thus, interference into patent
exclusivity to ensure societal benefit is viewed as a legitimate exercise serving the
41

See Dotan Oliar, Making Sense of the Intellectual Property Clause: Promotion of Progress
as a Limitation on Congress’s Intellectual Property Clause, 94 GEO. L.J. 1771, 1816 (2006)
(“[The] three considerations — the fact that the Framers would not adopt the intellectual
property proposals in the plenary form in which they were made, the political makeup of the
Convention, and the origin of the words in the Progress Clause as qualifiers of other powers —
all contribute to one consistent story according to which the Progress Clause was intended to
limit Congress’s intellectual property power.”).
42
JEFFERSON, supra note 34.
43
See William E. Simonds, Natural Right of Property in Intellectual Production, 1 YALE L.J.
16, 24 (1891).
44
Id. at 24.
45
Id. at 25.

57

N.Y.U. JOURNAL OF INTELL. PROP. & ENT. LAW

[Vol. 6:1

objective of the system. Elsewhere Simonds outlined that “[i]n all forms of society
all kinds of property are held under such conditions and limitations as society
deems reasonable. Under the right of eminent domain governments take private
property for public use on suitable remuneration when public necessity and
convenience demanded,”46 and that “[i]t is therefore entirely reasonable that
society should set a limit to the enjoyment of the natural right of property in
intellectual productions.”47
Three important points stand out from Simonds’ work that are exemplary of
early thinking regarding the limits of rights of the inventor.48 First, early thinking
on patent law was pervaded by concerns of its outcome – that is, the system’s
ability to achieve its preordained objectives – rather than the rights that it created.
Even a natural rights theorist such as Simonds considered circumscribing patent
exclusivity to achieve the system’s objectives. Second, early developments of
patent law seemed to repeatedly warrant interference into patent exclusivity if the
patent system was not primarily functioning to ensure flow of benefits to society.
Thus, it leaves a perception that early thinking revolved around the concept of
society tolerating the grant of some rights on the inventor, as opposed to an
inventor earning these rights. Third, the obvious view from the societal lens
dictates adequate limitations if the end – the public benefit objective of the system
– is not well served.
These three points taken together demonstrate that the correlative duty is not
a per se reward for the inventor’s genius, but a toleration by society, driven and
dictated by the larger public benefit. An inventor can gain recognition and rights as
a consequence of the invention, but the exclusivity aspect of the right is simply an
intended by-product of the correlative duty that the society willingly tolerates.
From the perspective of the law of contracts, correlative duty can be viewed as a
consideration for the larger public benefit. Simonds’ background as the
Commissioner of Patents perhaps defined his conception of patents as a natural
right. Yet both Simonds and Jefferson seem to suggest that the operation of patent
law and the exercise of exclusivity is circumscribed by the needs of society.

46

Id. at 23.
Id. at 24.
48
See MERGES, supra note 11, at 148 (expounding fully Locke’s theory of property and
applying it to intellectual property rights).
47
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Interestingly, Professor Balganesh makes a similar assertion in the
background of H.L.A. Hart’s philosophy with respect to copyright law.49 Professor
Balganesh suggests that “while the [rights and duties] always go together, the
systematic neglect of copyright’s ‘duties’ in copyright jurisprudence and
scholarship has over time skewed our understanding of copyright’s basic structure
as an area of law endowed with an obligatory dimension. . . .”50 Patent law suffers
from the same malaise. The rights package of patents necessarily embodies
obligations imposed on patent holders, a corresponding obligation to bring forth
public benefit. The framework of the obligations are perhaps reminiscent of the
bipolar feature of private law highlighted by Professor Balganesh, who noted that
the rights package vested on the inventor necessarily imposes a correlative duty on
the society to not infringe, and a corresponding obligation on the inventor to
generate public benefit.51 When exclusive rights are considered from the
perspective of the self-imposed correlative duty of society to refrain from the
property in exchange for public benefit, patent law can be accommodated into the
edifice of private law. In turn, the inventor’s corresponding duty to society arises
from the overlay of the law of contracts over theories of intellectual property law.52
While patent law is not a perfect fit within the property regime, broad
encapsulation of the limits of patent rights treads closely with the Lockean theory
of property. Locke elaborates, “Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or
destroy.”53 Locke conceives of property rights as entitlements to a person for
exercising labor:
The same law of Nature that does by this means give us property, does
also bound that property too. . . . As much as anyone can make use of
to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labor
fix his property in. Whatever is beyond this is more than his share,
and belongs to others. . . .54
Thus, under the Lockean conception of property, the appropriation of
property rights is only through the creator’s own sweat of the brow, and the right is
49

Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Obligatory Structure of Copyright Law: Unbundling the
Wrong of Copying, 125 HARV. L. REV 1664, 1665-66 (2012).
50
Id. at 1666.
51
See id. at 1667-68.
52
See id.; Raymond T. Nimmer, Breaking Barriers: The Relation Between Contract and
Intellectual Property Law, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 827, 844 (1998) (writing with reference to
copyright law although the same principles can be applied to patent law).
53
JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 136 (Thomas I. ed., 1947) (1690).
54
Id.
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subject to the sufficiency and spoliation obligations. The sufficiency restriction
requires that one must leave “enough and as good” for others, which Locke asserts
is an integral part of a just property regime. The spoliation principle states that the
creator may only appropriate as much as the creator is able to use, and may not
claim ownership of so many natural resources that some of them spoil before he is
able to use them.55
Locke’s theory of sufficiency and spoliation goes further than Simonds’
necessity theory and provides a clearer limitation to the natural rights over
property. In the patent context, while Locke’s theory fully recognizes the rights of
the inventor, it also subjects the rights to the sufficiency and spoilage limitations.
Locke’s implication is that the space for disputes over property exists because
resources can become limited even though they may presently exist in abundance.
That is, an inventor’s appropriation should be limited by need and not greed. Also,
property holders must leave “enough and as good” for others. Locke repeatedly
suggests that there is something morally wrong with distributions in which some
people’s property leaves others with very little.56 Ironically, largess of possession
has come to present a problem in the contemporary patent system. That is, the
grant of patent rights cannot work to the detriment of social benefit. If it does, the
sufficiency proviso will empower society to use the property for public benefit.
Commenting on this, John Simmons would later say, “[t]he clear implication is
that in later ages, when scarcity is a problem, there is room for doubt about . . .
largeness of possession.”57
Writing about the Lockean provisos in the context of copyright law, Wendy
Gordon asserts, “[i]f a new creation renders the public domain less valuable, the
proviso gives people a privilege to use the new creation to the extent necessary to
make themselves as well off as they previously were.”58 Among other things,
Gordon asserts that this means that major cultural developments must be open for

George H. Smith, John Locke: Some Qualifications in Locke’s Theory of Property,
LIBERTARIANISM.ORG (Nov. 2015), available at http://www.libertarianism.org/columns/johnlocke-some-qualifications-lockes-theory-property.
56
Daniel M. Layman, Sufficiency and Freedom in Locke’s Theory of Property, EUR. J. POL.
THEORY (2015), available at http://ept.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/06/01/1474885
115587118.full.pdf.
57
JOHN A. SIMMONS, THE LOCKEAN THEORY OF RIGHTS 291 (1992).
58
Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the
Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1572 (1993).
55
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all to use in order to preserve the integrity of the public domain. 59 In the patent
context, life-saving drugs created using biodiversity products or drugs created
using public funds are examples of classes of things that society should have
access to use to the extent necessary. Gordon also concludes that the spoliation
proviso in the copyright context prevents ownership over abstract ideas because it
“preserves . . . public domain.”60 A similar limitation is needed in the patent
context. Public health is a great example to serve as a bar for limiting exclusivity
following the grant of the patent. Such limitations will also define the contours of
the corresponding obligation of the patent owner in return for the rights gained.
Lack of an adequate public interest exception and flexibility to enable access in the
patent context can lead to disastrous outcomes. This is particularly the case, for
example, in the event of a public health crisis, which can potentially be more
disastrous in economic value than a copyright regime without a free speech
exception. Such a reading underscores the importance of the public interest
limitations of patent rights.61
In the context of Lockean exceptions, it is worth pointing out that Curtis
believes that public benefits from patents flowed through two channels: first, the
practice of the invention during the patent term; second, the opportunity to practice
the patent after its expiration.62 The Curtis treatise is perhaps the first to
contextualize the importance of practicing the invention during the term. In doing
so, Curtis seemingly connects exclusivity with the spoliation proviso in that it
imposes a burden on the patentee to practice the invention during the patent term to
prevent spoliation. Curtis’ work is significant in highlighting a nexus between
exclusivity vested on the inventor and the requirement that the inventor practice
the invention during the term. The question of whether practice of the invention by
the inventor during the term is relevant to securing the broader public benefit goals

59

Id. But see JEREMY WALDRON, GOD, LOCKE AND EQUALITY: CHRISTIAN FOUNDATIONS IN
LOCKE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT 158-63 (2002) (asserting that sufficiency is not a limitation
especially where resources are scarce).
60
Id.
61
But see Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in
Intellectual Property, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 841, 847 (1993) (“Being constrained by rules of
intellectual property is a different matter from being constrained by material property rules. The
homeless person may freeze or starve because he finds himself excluded from every sheltered
place and prohibited from taking literally any piece of food.”). Waldron’s assertions completely
ignore the impact of being constrained by intellectual property from accessing essential
medication.
62
CURTIS, supra note 35.
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of the system has become an important issue.63 Curtis’ conception of exclusivity as
creating at least an opportunity for the public to practice the invention is much
broader than a mere disclosure to the public. At the very minimum, it prevents the
patentee from hoarding the patent by not putting it into use during the patent term.
This conception of exclusivity prevents inventors from circumventing the patent
system by deliberately not practicing the invention and, in effect, hiding the
invention from the public during the term of the patent.
The above discussion on exclusivity is important to understand the
foundations of the exclusivity doctrine. The repeated resonance of the public
benefit objective is a common theme that informs both the historical and
philosophical foundations of the exclusivity doctrine. It is imperative for the
contemporary patent regimes to be engaged with the foundational objectives for
the system. With that background, the discussion below outlines the role of patent
disclosure to determine its role vis-à-vis patent exclusivity as well as the objectives
of the system.
II
THE EMERGENCE OF A RIGHTS-CENTERED PATENT REGIME
This part traces how, over time, the U.S. patent regime has become more
rights-centric by focusing on the assumption that more disclosures entail more
innovation. Such an encapsulation of the patent regime relegated the public benefit
objective to a secondary position as a by-product instead of a mandatory
obligation. The discussion below begins with how disclosures came to occupy a
central position. It then highlights the various roles that courts have embraced for
patent disclosures, which in turn has taken the focus away from the question of
whether the system is serving its historical objective of benefitting society.
A. Early Signs of Disconnect
This section examines the engagement of the exclusivity doctrine with the
disclosure aspect of patent registration. In doing so, it traces the effect of such
engagement as resulting in a disconnect of the exclusivity doctrine from its
intended goals and public benefit expectations.
Historically, it would be incorrect to categorize the U.S. patent system as
tending towards the rights side of the balance. In Kendell v. Windsor,64 the
63
64

Id.
Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. 322, 328 (1858).
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Supreme Court noted that “[t]he limited and temporary monopoly granted to
inventors was never designed for their exclusive profit or advantage . . . the benefit
to the public or community at large was another and doubtless the primary object
in granting and securing that monopoly.”65 Rather, “the true policy and ends of the
patent laws enacted under this Government are disclosed in that article of the
Constitution . . . ‘to promote the progress of science and the useful arts,’
contemplating and necessarily implying their extension, and increasing adaptation
to the uses of society.”66 Courts were cautious not to create unwarranted private
property. The skepticism against granting a patent was so high that there was a
time when Justice Jackson himself lamented that “the only patent that is valid is
one which this court has not been able to get its hands on.”67
Yet the seeds of a rights-centric regime were laid much earlier. The
constitutional powers of Congress notwithstanding, courts – especially the U.S.
Supreme Court – have played an important role in shaping the doctrine. 68 Two
cases in the early 1800s arguably set the tone for correlating public acquisition at
the end of the patent term as fulfilling the components of the exclusivity
obligation. In Evans v. Eaton,69 the Supreme Court held that “patent law confers a
benefit on the discoverer of any artful invention, which consists in a monopoly of
his invention for a limited time.”70 Further, “[t]he consideration which it requires
him to pay for this benefit, is to put the public in possession of his invention; so as
to enable all to use it, after his monopoly shall expire.”71 The Court’s use of the
term “consideration” alluded to the patent holder putting the public in possession
of the invention in exchange for securing the rights. But the Court defined the
consideration in exchange for exclusivity as the public benefitting and progressing
from the invention after the monopoly expires, focusing on disclosure and ignoring
other important aspects such as the public benefit from practicing the invention
65

Id. The House Committee reporting on the 1909 Copyright Act echoed the same sentiment:
“[T]he enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Constitution is not
based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings, . . . but upon the ground that the
welfare of the public will be served . . . .” H.R. REP. NO. 60-2222, at 7 (1909).
66
Kendall, 62 U.S. at 328.
67
Jungersen v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949).
68
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The concept of exclusivity is ingrained in the Constitution “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to authors and
inventors the exclusive right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Id.
69
Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1818).
70
Id. at 413; see also MERRILL D. PETERSON, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND THE NEW NATION: A
BIOGRAPHY 937-38 (1975).
71
Evans, 20 U.S. at 413-14; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
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during the patent term. Similarly, in the 1829 case Pennock v. Dialogue,72 Justice
Story opined that the crux of the patent system is to enable the public to ultimately
acquire the innovation while recording “due regard” to the inventor in the form of
exclusivity.73 While it is clear that the Court conceptualized the objective of a
patent in terms of public acquisition of the invention, these cases implied that the
public benefit aspect of exclusivity can flow after the patent term.
Further, these cases also laid the foundation for a steady instrumental
development of patents by positing a patent holder’s exclusive rights on a broad
platform of the progress of science and arts.74 That is, they led to an organic
appreciation wherein the relationship between patents and the progress requirement
was measured by the quantity of patents, which in turn, fed into the public benefit.
The result was a slow process that steadily divorced or distanced the inventor from
any direct obligation to achieve the ultimate goal of public benefit. To date, the
constituent elements of the “progress” requirements remain unresolved. Whether it
is the disclosure, number of patents, technological advancement, public benefit, or
a combination of one or more of these factors, remains unsettled.75 Over time,
however, courts have come to view patent protection as a necessity for
encouraging innovation despite economic studies to the contrary, which, in turn,
has resulted in a view that the extent of private property rolled out is a standard
measure of progress.76 But even assuming that the number of patents issued can
72

Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1 (1829).
Id. at 12 (“The constitution of the United States has declared, that congress shall have
power ‘to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to
authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.’ It
contemplates, therefore, that this exclusive right shall exist but for a limited period, and that the
period shall be subject to the discretion of congress.”).
74
Id.; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1980); Oliar, supra note 41, at
1816.
75
Simone A. Rose, The Supreme Court and Patents: Moving Toward a Postmodern Vision of
“Progress”?, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1197, 1203 (2013).
76
See Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. USPTO, 653 F.3d 1329, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(arguing that patent protection for genomic material, including isolated genes is crucial for
continued innovation and economic growth of biotechnology industry). Judge Newman wrote:
73

The decisions in Allappat and State Street Bank confirmed the patent eligibility of
many evolving areas of commerce, as inventors and investors explored new
technological capabilities. The public and the economy have experienced
extraordinary advances in information-based and computer-managed processes,
supported by an enlarging patent base. The PTO reports that in Class 705, the
examination classification associated with “business methods” and most likely to
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serve as a loose measure of technological advancement, the public benefit aspect of
progress, or in other words, the application of the technology towards societal
progress, remains unclear.77 That is, the patent system has been clearly posited as
being ordained by the Constitution to promote progress, but much is needed to
decipher the elements of progress. It cannot be mechanically equated with either
technological advancement or number of patents issued without a clear delineation
of public benefit goals.
Under basic contract theories, on which patent law is partly premised,
vesting rights sans appropriate obligations (which happens if the term “progress” is
not viewed as a limitation) would skew the contract. Thus, the constituents of
progress should be defined so that the mere act of invention is not associated as a
contribution to progress, whether or not it does in fact. The currently prevailing
and seemingly narrow view of progress is not universally accepted, and in fact fits
uneasily with constitutional goals of countries that define economic and social
advancement as an element of progress.78 International trade agreements also
recognize a broader definition of progress. For example, Article 7 of the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights notes that
protecting and enforcing intellectual property rights “should contribute . . . to a
balance of rights and obligations” of members in a manner conducive to social and
economic welfare.79 Thus, benefits to the society from access, sustainability of the
ensuing development, public health, and food security – defined more generally as

receive inventions that may not use machinery or transform physical matter, there
were almost 10,000 patent applications filed in FY 2006 alone, and over 40,000
applications filed since FY 98 when State Street Bank was decided. An amicus in
the present case reports that over 15,000 patents classified in Class 705 have
issued. The industries identified with information- based and data-handling
processes, as several amici curiae explain and illustrate, include fields as diverse
as banking and finance, insurance, data processing, industrial engineering, and
medicine.
In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 992 (Newman, J., dissenting), aff'd but criticized sub nom. Bilski v.
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
77
Rose, supra note 75, at 1201.
78
The Indian Constitution emphasizes balancing social and economic rights. See INDIA
CONST. pmbl. Article 21 of the Indian Constitution guarantees the right to life, which includes
the right to good health. See id. art. 21.
79
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 7, Apr. 15, 1994
[hereinafter TRIPS].
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public benefit – are all factors that form important measurements of progress.80
Such a construction of progress serves as a limitation to the exclusive rights
conferred in expectation of progress.81 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has
provided little guidance on the progress limitation of the intellectual property
clause of the Constitution.82
Notably, in 1908, the Supreme Court was presented with an opportunity to
define a limit to patent rights vis-à-vis the public benefit objectives.83 The Supreme
Court, in Continental Paper Bag, considered whether it could restrain the
infringement of a patent “which has long and always and unreasonably been held
in nonuse . . . instead of being made beneficial to the art to which it belongs.”84 The
question presented was whether an inventor could choose not to exploit the patent
during its term, or in other words, whether the owner of an unused patent is limited
in law from alleging infringement.85 In dealing with this question, the Court
emphasized that exclusivity characterized the absoluteness of the inventor’s
property rights: “[E]xclusion vests a legal privilege on the inventor to withhold
See Rose, supra note 75, at 1198 (“A radicalized modern view of patent law allows us to
challenge the incentive-centered narrative of promoting progress and consider this narrative’s
impact on future discoveries, humanism, morality and the environment.”).
81
See Oliar, supra note 41, at 1804-05 (cogently constructing how from a historical,
interpretative and policy perspective, the term “progress” is meant to serve as a limitation of the
Constitutional powers of the Congress in the IP clause); Jeanne C. Fromer, The Intellectual
Property Clause’s External Limitations, 61 DUKE L.J. 1329, 1339 (2012); Rose, supra note 75,
at 1201 n.11 (“Both Oliar and Fromer evaluate the structural composition of the IP Clause and
persuasively argue that the nonbinding precedent view is incorrect since it fails to give meaning
to the first ‘empowerment’ portion of the clause and goes against the natural textual reading or
an ends-means relationship between providing exclusive rights (the means) to promote the end
result of promoting progress.”). But see 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03 (2004) (treating the “progress” portion of the IP clause as a
preamble term introducing Congress’s broad powers in implementing Patent and Copyright
protection).
82
See Malla Pollock, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining “Progress” in Article
I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80
NEB. L. REV. 754, 767 (2001); Rose, supra note 75, at 1203 (clarifying that progress in the paper
references a general sense and not progress in the copyright sense).
83
See United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 250 (1897) (“The inventor is one who
has discovered something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold the knowledge
of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages and benefits which the statute
promises to him who discloses to the public his invention.”).
84
Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co. (Continental Paper Bag), 210 U.S. 405, 422
(1908).
85
Id.
80
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knowledge from the public while insisting on deriving the advantages and benefits
the statute promises.”86 Unused patents deprive the public of the patent’s benefits
during the term and thus prejudicially impact the public interest.87 The Court
refused to acknowledge the effects of nonuse on competition or on public rights.88
Instead, the Court noted, “[i]t is the privilege of any owner of property to use or
not use it, without question of motive.”89 As a result, the Court filtered out
“working the invention during the term” from the public benefit aspect, thereby
leaving “disclosure” as the sole residue that constitutes the public benefit output. In
doing so, Continental Paper Bag marked a watershed moment, showcasing a shift
towards treatment of patents as absolute property instead of a governmental grant
which entails responsibilities towards the public.
After Continental Paper Bag, judicial opinions supporting limitations on
exclusivity have remained as minority opinions.90 Indeed, the Supreme Court
expressly reconsidered Continental Paper Bag in eBay v. MercExchange,91 but
unfortunately refused to reject or adopt a different approach, such as requiring the
use or practice of the patented material during the term.92 The decision found that
86

Id. at 424; see also Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. at 249.
See id.
88
Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted) (responding to
the petitioner’s assertion regarding the effect on competitors, the Court added that “whenever
this court has had occasion to speak, it has decided that an inventor receives from a patent the
right to exclude others from its use for the time prescribed in the statute. And, for his exclusive
enjoyment of it during that time, the public faith is pledged”).
89
Id. at 429.
90
Restricting exclusivity has remained the minority position in the United States. For
example, the dissent of District Judge Aldrich in the First Circuit, from where Continental Paper
Bag was appealed, favored restricting patent rights on the grounds that nonuse of patents for
private benefits discouraged inventive activity. See Cont’l Paper Bag Co. v. E. Paper Bag Co.,
150 F. 741 (1st Cir. 1906). Judge Aldrich stated that patents were meant to encourage invention
by protecting the right to make, use and vend the product in public interest. Hence, he opined
that the court should discourage activities hindering that objective by preventing the patent
owner from alleging infringement. Judge Aldrich felt that the patent owner’s nonuse was for
unconscionable private pecuniary gain. In not restricting the patent owner’s right, Judge Aldrich
felt that the court of equity helped the owner to accomplish nonuse for private gains and thus
contravened the spirit of equity and public policy. Id. at 745, 757. Justice Douglas recaptured the
substance of Judge Aldrich’s opinion, albeit in his dissent, in Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S.
370 (1945). Justice Douglas argued that courts should interfere where patent owners misuse
patents since patents are conditioned on public purposes per U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. See
Special Equip., 324 U.S. at 384; see also Cont’l Paper Bag Co., 150 F. at 744-45, 757.
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eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
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See id. at 393.
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infringement remedies should be subject to the traditional four-factor test based on
equitable considerations to determine whether an injunction should issue in favor
of a patent owner against an alleged infringer.93 However, the Supreme Court did
not go further to treat nonuse of the patent by the owner as a ground to deny
injunctive relief or be a central part of the four-factor test.94 Of particular interest is
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, which specifically identifies that “[a]n industry has
developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for producing and selling goods
but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”95 While Justice Kennedy
strongly advocates against automatically affirming a patentee’s absolute right to
exclude through injunctions in cases of non-practicing patentees, the concurrence
urges courts to grant damages of reasonable royalties.96 The guidance from the
Supreme Court has resulted in courts increasingly approving reasonable royalties
and vacating permanent injunctions.97 Yet Continental Paper Bag stands in
contrast to the wisdom of the Curtis treatise.98 The case serves as an early exemplar
of how courts have failed to construe practice of inventions during the patent term
as part of the inventor’s obligation to contribute to the public benefit paradigm in
return for exclusivity.99 Unfortunately, courts have not ventured to determine
whether a patentee’s rights entail an obligation, in public interest, to practice the
93

Id.
Id.
95
See eBay, 547 U.S. at 395-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
96
Id.
97
See, e.g., Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1380-81 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
(approving a reasonable royalty award and vacating an injunction); See Neil Tyler, Patent
nonuse and technology suppression: The use of compulsory licensing to promote progress, 162
U. Pa. L. Rev. 451, 467 ( 2013); See also Jaideep Venkatesan, Compulsory Licensing of
Nonpracticing Patentees After eBay v. MercExchange, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 26, 31 (2009)
(“These courts have decided, though not always expressly, that a nonpracticing patentee is
entitled only to the royalty it would have earned had the parties executed a license . . . .”).
98
CURTIS, supra note 35.
99
See, for example, SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981) where Xerox
was sued for refusing to use or license its patents involving its paper copier technology. The
court asserted that this was a lawful exercise of its patent rights. See also PETER MEINHARDT,
INVENTIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 189 (1946) (“Probably 80 to 90 percent of all patented
inventions are not worked in practice.”). See also Kurt M. Saunders, Patent Nonuse and the Role
of Public Interest as a Deterrent to Technology Suppression, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 389, 394
(2002) (discussing the anticompetitive effects of patent nonuse); see also SRIVIDHYA RAGAVAN,
PATENT AND TRADE DISPARITIES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS (2012)
(highlighting how internationally, jurisdictions like India did emphasize the practice through
working requirements and how the TRIPS Agreement has forced such requirements to be
amended on the grounds that it affects international trade).
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patent during the term. Emphasis on practicing the patent during its term could
have prevented some of the woes from Continental Paper Bag, as outlined below.
B. Woes of Continental Paper Bag
Continental Paper Bag set the tone for the manifestation of several woes
from not obligating the practice of patents during the term. First, Continental
Paper Bag has served as an important background to establish the absoluteness of
the exclusive rights during the patent term and thus ignore public interest-based
responsibilities of patentees to practice during the term of the patent.100 Over time,
patent owners have capitalized on patents by not practicing the invention during
the term and reaping the benefits by asserting the patent strategically against (often
unassuming) practicing entities.101 Patent owners keep the patent from the public
until it can be successfully asserted against a practicing entity. The perversity of
the problem is best understood through the reality that a new business model has
developed where patent owners benefit from hoarding instead of using the
patent.102 This behavior has led to ‘trolling,’ which is defined as the act of using the
patent merely as an assertion tool (to assert against infringers) and not as a tool for
furthering innovation.103 That a considerable number of patent holders choose to
find hoarding more rewarding than commercializing the patent during the
monopoly term is telling of the woes that have affected the system from not
associating practice of the invention during the term with the larger goals of the
system.
Second, failing to associate the use of the patent with the resulting public
interest goals has strengthened the association of disclosure with the ultimate goals
of the system.104 Slowly, the status of disclosure has been elevated as the main quid
100

Continental Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 424.
See, e.g., F.T.C., TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND
PATENT LAW AND POLICY 38-39 (2003), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/10/innovationrpt.pdf.
102
See, e.g., MercExchange, 547 U.S. at 396-97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“An
industry has developed in which firms use patents not as a basis for production and selling
goods but, instead, primarily for obtaining licensing fees.”).
103
See Saunders, supra note 99 (discussing the anticompetitive effects of patent nonuse).
104
Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1028 (1989) (“The incentive to disclose argument,
which has been more popular with the courts than with commentators, rests on the premise that
in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep their inventions secret in order to
prevent competitors from exploiting them.”); see also Fritz Machlup, Subcomm. on Patents,
Trademarks, and Copyrights of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., An Economic Review
of the Patent System, 32-33 (1958) (discussing four theses that are offered for patent protection:
101
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pro quo of the inventor’s monopoly.105 Although the constitutional goal of
“promoting the progress of useful arts” was never formally relegated to a
secondary position,106 the return for securing the bundle of rights was gradually
narrowed to the element of public disclosure.107 Even the Supreme Court
effectively treated public disclosure as the only consideration in exchange for
granting patent rights. Indeed, in 1933, the Supreme Court elaborated, “in
consideration of [an invention’s] disclosure and the consequent benefit to the
community, the patent [wa]s granted.”108 This proposition later found its way into
Bonito Boats,109 the 1989 decision which laid the groundwork for the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit (Federal Circuit) to embrace the exact
proposition.110 Thus, disclosure came to be the only element needed to fulfill the
progress requirement.111 As the disclosure doctrine slowly became identified with
the consequential public benefit and the progress of useful arts requirement, it was
a natural shift to justify patentees’ rights as a return for the disclosure made.

(i) the “natural-law” thesis; (ii) the “reward-by-monopoly” thesis; (iii) the “monopoly-profitincentive” thesis; and (iv) the “exchange-for-secrets” thesis, and further elaborating on the last
thesis that it works on the premise that in the absence of patent protection inventors would keep
their inventions secret in order to prevent competitors from exploiting them); WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF
TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 89 (1969).
105
See, e.g., Cole M. Fauver, Compulsory Patent Licensing in the United States: An Idea
Whose Time Has Come, 8 J. INTL. L. BUS. 666, 668-70 (1998). That is, the inventor reveals the
invention in return for the government’s promise of a specified statutory monopoly on the
production of the idea. Id. at 681; see also The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7608 (2006); Jondora
Music Publ’g Co. v. Melody Recordings, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 572, 577 (D.N.J. 1972).
106
See Timothy Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent Clause: Are There Limits on the
United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 2-3 (2004) (asserting
that the language in Article 1, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution “to promote the Progress of the
Useful Arts” is the mandate to promote patents, and that the reference to “science” relates to the
Copyright Act).
107
Ewin, supra note 37, at 481.
108
U.S. v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 amended by U.S. v. Dubilier
Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 706 (1933).
109
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51 (1989).
110
See Roin, supra note 16, at 2011-12 (“The Federal Circuit, which hears the bulk of patent
infringement suits, frequently uses the same rhetoric, describing disclosure as the ‘linchpin’ and
‘quid pro quo’ of the patent system.”); see also W.L. Gore & Assocs. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d
1540, 1550 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 970 (Fed. Cir.
2002).
111
See Roin, supra note 16.
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C. The Rights-Centric Regime
The above narrative highlighted how the disclosure requirement gained a
central position in defining the objectives of the patent system. The narrative below
describes how the disclosure requirement has been used to further expand the
scope of patent rights. The disclosure requirement has resulted in more patents
without necessarily resulting in a corresponding increase in innovation.
First, materials not disclosed in a specific manner were treated as being
unknown to the public, and thus susceptible to creating private rights. The
teaching, suggestion, and motivation (TSM) test serves as an example of this
proposition. The TSM test was first applied in the 1960s by the Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals (the Federal Circuit’s predecessor) to determine the burden of
proof for nonobviousness during patent prosecution.112 In ACS Hospital Systems,113
the Federal Circuit first enunciated that teachings of prior art references could be
combined to prove obviousness only if there was a specific teaching, suggestion, or
motivation in the prior art to do so.114 By 1985, the Federal Circuit elevated this
rule into a standardized prescription from which examiners could not derogate.115
Consequently, examiners were prohibited from rejecting patent applications for
obviousness unless they had “elucidate[d] . . . factual teachings, suggestions or
incentives from th[e] prior art that show[] . . . the propriety of [the patented] . . .
combination.”116 In other words, under the TSM test, the examiner bears the initial
prima facie burden to show clear teaching, suggestion, or motivation from the prior
art such that it would have led a person of ordinary skill in the art to combine the
references to arrive at the claimed invention. Thus, a claimed application will be
112

See Application of Rinehart, 531 F.2d 1048 (C.C.P.A. 1976); Application of Regel, 526
F.2d 1399 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Application of Avery, 518 F.2d 1228 (C.C.P.A. 1975); Application
of Imperato, 486 F.2d 585 (C.C.P.A. 1973); Application of Andre, 52 C.C.P.A. 1019 (1965).
113
ACS Hosp. Sys, Inc. v. Montefiore Hosp. (ACS Hospital Systems), 732 F.2d 1572, 1577
(Fed. Cir. 1984); see also ROBERT P. MERGES & JOHN F. DUFFY, PATENT LAW AND POLICY:
CASES AND MATERIALS 664 (4th ed. 2007) [hereinafter MERGES & DUFFY].
114
See ACS Hospital Systems, 732 F.2d at 1577.
115
MERGES & DUFFY, infra note 120; see also Ashland Oil v. Delta Resins & Refractories,
776 F.2d 281, 297 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
116
Id.; see also In re Kemps, 97 F.3d 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that the Patent and
Trademark Office’s factual determinations on the issue of obviousness, regarding which
references teach and whether a reference teaches toward or away from claimed invention, are
binding on the Court of Appeals, which employed the clearly erroneous standard). But see In re
Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (reversing the above decision and noting that the PTO
Board’s decision will be subject to substantial evidence standard under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
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considered prima facie nonobvious unless there is a showing of specific teaching,
suggestion or motivation from the prior art to make the combination.117
The TSM test in effect lowered the threshold of prima facie obviousness
during prosecution by creating a standardized prescription to determine an
objective element. The TSM test was touted as a means to minimize examiners’
subjectivity and reduce rejections of patent applications based on hindsight bias.118
But it eliminated a critical element – the application of common sense of an
examiner – from the obviousness determination.119 Thus, the TSM standard created
a unique form of legal obviousness by disengaging the examiner’s use of common
sense.120 The end result was application materials otherwise obvious to a person of
ordinary skill in the art which were able to clear the legal nonobvious threshold.121
This greatly facilitated stacking more private rights to the detriment of the public
domain. In Re Dembiczak stands as an outstanding demonstration of the above
point.122 There, the Federal Circuit held that a Halloween-themed trash bag was a
patentable invention because there was no prior art showing a “clear and
particular” teaching to use all of the claim limitations, namely, the use of a plastic
bag in pre-manufactured orange color and with specific Halloween facial indicia.123
In re Dembiczak was by no means an aberration, but instead formed part of a
steady stream of cases where the line between obvious and nonobvious was
determined by what was typecast in the prior art, as opposed to what existed in the
public domain.124 While the TSM test may have taken credit for reducing rejections
based on hindsight bias, it clearly led to an over-allowance of patent applications.
117

See Application of Rinehart, 531 F.2d at 1052 (standing for the proposition that the burden
shifts onto the patentee to prove nonobviousness of the claimed invention by putting forward
objective evidence).
118
Obviousness is an objective test conducted from the vantage point of a person of skill in
the art. See 35 U.S.C. §103 (2012).
119
Feroz Ali Khader & Srividhya Ragavan, Proof of Progress: The Role of Obviousness
Standard in the Indian Patent Office, in GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES ON PATENT LAW 571 (2014).
120
Srividhya Ragavan & Feroz Khader, The Selection Of Patents: Regulatory Reforms versus
Market Reliance To Weed Out Suspect Patents, 46(1) INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION
L. 38, 44 (2015).
121
Id. at 44-45.
122
See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999) abrogated by In re Gartside, 203 F.3d
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
123
See id. at 1000.
124
See Khader & Ragavan, supra note 119, at 596; see also Winner Int’l Royalty Corp. v.
Wang, 202 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ecolochem, Inc. v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 227 F.3d
1361, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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As for disclosures, in excluding specifically undisclosed materials from the
definition of prior art, even if the material was otherwise obvious, the TSM test
resulted in further elevating the role and importance of disclosures. The test stood
on the assumption that submitted prior arts should be embodiments of every
possible teaching and combination applicable to an invention. Consequently,
materials not explicitly taught, suggested, or motivated by the prior art were
susceptible to a prima facie clearance as being nonobvious.125 The result was more
patents, some of which embodied minor innovations, leading to more private rights
to the detriment of the public domain and the progress requirement.126
The rigid application of the TSM test resulted in a marked difficulty “to
invalidate bad patents, and thereby stifling innovation.”127 The costs to society
from the monopolies awarded by patents embodying a lower obviousness threshold
became unjustified.128 The result was a perverse trend in the United States, where
about fifty-five percent of patents were not renewed at the eight-year period after
their issuance.129 The TSM test was largely diluted after the Supreme Court
intervened in KSR v. Teleflex and reestablished a common sense based approach
similar to the statutory test in 35 U.S.C. § 103 to determine nonobviousness.130
125

See Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 171 (2006)
(asserting that the TSM test treats the nonobviousness requirement akin to the novelty test).
Holbrook suggests that it is akin to having one reference “incorporating by reference” all of the
other prior arts. Id.
126
Id.
127
Stephen G. Kunin & Andrew K. Beverina, KSR’s Effect on Patent Law, 106 MICH. L. REV.
50, 50-51 (2007).
128
See Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner
at 9-11, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350); Brief of Amici
Curiae Cisco Systems Inc. et al. in Support of Reversal for Petitioner at 2-3, KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (arguing that the suggestion test’s low bar to
patentability made patents of technologically trivial subject matter possible); Brief for the United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 10, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S.
398 (2007) (No. 04-1350) (“[The suggestion test] exacts a heavy cost in the form of unwarranted
extension of patent protection to obvious subject matter.”); see also Randall J. Hirsch, Well Duh:
Obviousness, Gas Pedals, and the Teaching-Suggestion-Motivation Test, 6 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 89, 90 (2007) (asserting that the general criticism of the TSM test was that it set
the threshold too low for patentability, allowing for the issuance of obvious patents, which
contravenes public policy).
129
William H. Brown, Trends in Patent Renewal at the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 17 WORLD PAT. INFO. 225, 227 (1995) (noting that in 1994, statistics indicated that only
about fifty-five percent of patents are renewed at the end of the eight-year period).
130
KSR Int’l Co., 550 U.S. at 415-22. After KSR, the USPTO issued new examination
guidelines outlining several bases for rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103, one of which was the
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However, the historical development of the TSM test exemplifies how disclosures
were elevated to a point where common sense had a limited role.
Biotechnology patents represent an area where the disclosure requirement
has been extensively used to define the rights and limits of patenting.131 For
instance, a gradual lowering of standards in biotechnology inventions in the
1990s,132 such as in In Re Deuel,133 largely lowered the threshold for biotechnology
patent applications, resulting in an increase in biotechnology patent activity.134

TSM test; see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, § 2143 (U.S.P.T.O. 2008); see also
Tom Irving, Lauren L. Stevens & Scott M. K. Lee, Nonobviousness in the U.S. Post-KSR for
Innovative Drug Companies, 34 U. DAYTON L. REV. 157, 159 (2009).
131
See Amy Maxmen, The Great Gene-Patent Debate: How the Myriad Genetics
Gene-Patent Case Might Affect Personalized Medicine, NATURE (July 20, 2012),
http://www.nature.com/news/the-great-gene-patent-debate-1.11044; Julia Carbone et al., DNA
Patents and Diagnostics: Not a Pretty Picture, 28 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 784 (2010); see
also Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc. (Mayo), 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 (2012)
(“The laws of nature at issue here are narrow laws that may have limited applications, but the
patent claims that embody them nonetheless implicate this concern . . . [a]nd they threaten to
inhibit the development of more refined treatment recommendations . . .”). See generally Ariad
Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1371-77 (Fed. Cir. 2009); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari at 17, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc. (Myriad), 133 S. Ct.
2107 (2013) (No. 11-72517); Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S.
124, 127 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The problem arises from the fact that patents do not
only encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention. Sometimes their
presence can discourage research by impeding the free exchange of information, for example by
forcing researchers to avoid the use of potentially patented ideas, by leading them to conduct
costly and time-consuming searches of existing or pending patents, by requiring complex
licensing arrangements, and by raising the costs of using the patented information, sometimes
prohibitively so.”).
132
See, e.g., Amgen v. Chugai, 927 F.2d 1200, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 1991). Amgen was a
decision rendered under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), and thus not a question of obviousness. The case
enabled the patentability of an adequately conceived DNA sequence. The Federal Circuit held
that DNA sequences adequately defined in a manner sufficiently disclosing its actual structure
and method of preparation would be considered as having been reduced to practice, even though
an inventor may be unaware of its actual structure and nowhere near disclosing the actual
structure. Id. at 1211; see also U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008.
133
In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that obvious to try is not
obvious); see also RAGAVAN, supra note 99, at 211-12.
134
Sara Dastgheib-Vinarov, A Higher Nonobviousness Standard for Gene Patents: Protecting
Biomedical Research from the Big Chill, 4 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 143 (2000).
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This resulted in a proliferation of intellectual property rights in biomedical
research.135 As one court noted,
[B]etween 1990 and 1998, the total number of biotechnology patents
granted to U.S. corporations has quadrupled. In contrast, between
1990 and 1998, the total number of patents issued increased by about
sixty percent. This large disparity is cause for concern. It suggests that
the biotechnology industry is using the relaxed nonobviousness
standard to obtain genomic patents simply for corporate gain.136
The increase in patent activity was attributed to a regime that adequately
lowered thresholds, resulting in patenting of basic biotechnology research
materials. It placed the biotechnology industry in a “spiral of overlapping patent
claims in the hands of different owners.”137 The result was that some basic research
materials became inaccessible owing to the private property status which also
increased the access cost effectively slowing down the pace of innovation in this
area.138 While these realities mandated that the free-for-all in biotechnology patent
applications be capped, they also highlighted that the system greatly facilitated
accumulating patent rights.139 The Federal Circuit attempted to fix such a rightscentric patent regime by expanding the doctrine of written description, a traditional
disclosure doctrine, to include enabling functions, thereby further contributing to
the elevation of disclosure.140 In Eli Lilly, the Federal Circuit held that a functional
definition of a gene would be insufficient to meet the written description
requirement because it merely indicates what the gene does, rather than what it

135

See Anita Varma & David Abraham, DNA Is Different: Legal Obviousness and the
Balance Between Biotech Inventors and the Market, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 53, 78 (1996) (“On
the one hand, based on prior art knowledge, the biotechnologist knows that sequencing around
twenty amino acids is sufficient to obtain the cDNA sequence that codes for a particular
protein, absent unforeseen difficulties. On the other hand, under current law, the expected
product of this scientifically obvious manipulation is legally unobvious and thus patentable.”).
136
Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 134, at 165.
137
Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. MAG. 698 (1998).
138
Id.
139
Cf. Dastgheib-Vinarov, supra note 134, at 165.
140
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566-69 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
Shraddha A. Upadhaya, The Postmodern Written Description Requirement: An Analysis of the
Application of the Heightened Written Description Requirement to Original Claims, 4 MINN.
INTELL. PROP. REV. 65, 109-10 (2002).
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is.141 The Federal Circuit further held that a “meaningful disclosure” was the
exchange for patent exclusivity and where the disclosure was inadequate, the
material was susceptible to being denied protection.142 From Eli Lilly in 1997
through the Ariad decision in 2010,143 the Federal Circuit largely relied on
enabling disclosures in the written description of biotechnology specifications as a
correctional mechanism.144
The above narrative highlights how disclosures have steadily grown to
occupy a central role in defining the rights and limits of patenting, obviating the
need for broader discussions on public benefit and the constituents of the progress
requirement.
III
RECOGNIZING RESPONSIBILITIES: CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION OF PATENTS
This part examines whether the normative framework imposes any
obligation on the inventor by examining the relationship between patent rights and
the theoretical bases of the societal duty not to infringe. In doing so, the narrative
focuses on fundamental values and returns that characterize the notions of
patenting. First, this part traces the philosophical underpinnings of the patent rights
framework. Second, it examines the philosophical justifications for these rights to
understand the framework for establishing the obligations of the right holder.
Lastly, this part focuses on how the duty practically operates and directs the law to
create fundamental values and returns (privilege duty) that characterize the notions
of patenting.145

141

Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1568; see also Lisa A. Karczewski, Comment, Biotechnological Gene
Patent Applications: The Implications of the USPTO Written Description Requirement
Guidelines on the Biotechnology Industry, 31 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1043, 1078 (2000) (arguing
that the court’s holding that a generic description of the genus such as “vertebrate insulin cDNA”
or “mammalian insulin cDNA” distinguishes the claimed genus only by function and hence is an
inadequate written description).
142
See Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 970; see also Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358
F.3d 916, 922 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 970).
143
Ariad Pharmaceuticals et al. v. Eli Lilly and Company (Ariad), 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir.
2010).
144
Id. at 1358 (finding the Ariad patent invalid on the grounds that the patent failed to
adequately describe the invention and thus, to enable the specification).
145
DRAHOS, supra note 15, at 220-23.
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A. Rights Framework
Western discourse on intellectual property law conceptualizes patents as
incentivizing the inventor and gathering the benefits of the exercise through public
disclosure.146 Exploring patents from the perspective of the relationship between
the rights and obligations is essential to appreciate the existing structure of the
rights-obligations balance. The desire to innovate, fuel creative genius, and
promote the progress of useful arts are all explanations that support the rights
paradigm of the patent system.147 These explanations, however, do not fully define
the societal obligation imposed on third parties to refrain from infringing patents.
The narrative below examines the philosophical underpinnings that can perhaps
justify the correlative obligation construct and its relationship with the vested
rights of the patent holder.
Bentham categorizes rights into two distinct typologies based on their
relationships with legal obligation.148 Bentham’s first category encompasses rights
resulting from the absence of legal obligations.149 Here, the law may actively
permit or passively not prohibit certain actions, leaving the right holder with the
liberty to decide whether or not to exercise the right.150 Bentham’s second category
addresses rights existing as a by-product of obligations imposed by law on
others.151 Patent exclusivity falls into this second category because it exists as a byproduct of a statutorily imposed societal obligation not to infringe the patent. The
legal obligation under the second category embodies a principal law “requiring the
act which is obligatory” and a subsidiary law “requiring or permitting punishment
for breach” of that obligation.152 The failure to conduct oneself in a specified
manner as required under a principal law should result in pain (or its equivalent,
loss of pleasure), which is legally imposed by a subsidiary law as a punitive
measure for non-compliance with the principal law.153 H.L.A Hart refers to this as
inherently embodying both imperative and probabilistic elements.154 It is
imperative in that sanctions are mandated by the subsidiary law and probabilistic in
146

See, e.g., MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 191
(Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 6th ed. 2012).
147
See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
148
H.L.A HART, ESSAYS ON BENTHAM 165 (1982) [hereinafter ESSAYS ON BENTHAM].
149
Id.
150
Id. at 166.
151
Id. at 165.
152
Id. at 134.
153
Id. at 131-32.
154
Id. at 132-34.
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that there is a probability of incurring sanctions if obligations are not fulfilled.
Bentham terms this second category of rights as “services,” typified by a
“correlative obligation,” which are requirements of action or forbearance imposed
on third parties.155 That is, a right is an “enforced service” that results when the law
creates a correlative obligation that imposes a duty of forbearance on society in
favor of the right holder.156 A patent right is an “enforced service” wherein
infringement of patents (even if by independent creation) represents an imposed
legal obligation.157 The correlative obligation of the society is a service right that
provides the inventor the ability to benefit from a duty of forbearance imposed on
the rest of the society.158 In other words, having a right correlative conferred by
law onto the right holder relative to an obligation denotes that it leads to a
benefit.159
The benefits to the right holder under these circumstances tend to be
indirect.160 The right holder may, but does not have to, benefit directly from the
performance of the legal obligation by others. Compliance by third parties with the
legal obligation to refrain from infringing patented materials makes it conducive
for the patent owner to benefit indirectly. Forbearance from the patented material
by third parties prevents a potential loss.161 Hence, the benefits that patent
exclusivity confers on the patent holder are indirect, negative in nature, and
dependent upon the compliance of third parties with their legal obligations.
Bentham defines them as contingently beneficial laws and notes that the duties
under such laws are relative to the right holder, who wields complete control over
the area covered by the duty. A right holder may, for instance, decide to prosecute
one individual with a duty of forbearance while deciding to waive his rights with
regard to a similar transgression by another individual. The concept of the relative
duty of the right holder contrasts with the more absolute nature of such duties
under criminal law, where certain actions are prohibited against all individuals by
enforcement of law.162 Thus, under a contingently beneficial law, the correlative
duties of third parties are akin to “species of normative property belonging to the
155

Id. at 168-69.
Id.
157
Id. at 169.
158
Id. at 168-69.
159
Id. at 168.
160
Id. at 176-77.
161
Daniel Sperling, POSTHUMOUS INTERESTS: LEGAL & ETHICAL PERSPECTIVES, CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS, at 72 (2008).
162
ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 148, at 185 n.88.
156
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right holder.”163 They are property that derives from norms that belong to identified
individuals, under which the right holder is empowered by the legal provisions to
enjoy a special control.164 Termed as the power of “contrectation,” the right
holder’s power is a legal permission to an act which, if done by any other, would
result in the contravention of the law.165
The benefits flowing to the right holder from contingently beneficial laws
invariably remain dependent on a plethora of causes and effects. For example, the
patent application process has carefully tailored disclosure requirements to
facilitate future replication.166 Statutory requirements such as written description
and enablement serve to ensure that even if the inventor perishes, the invention
remains available to the public.167 Thus, an inventor whose patent application falls
short of statutory requirements like disclosure may see the flow of benefits
discontinued under certain conditions. Similarly, a refusal to disclose the invention
will lead to a refusal of the bundle of rights that forms the patent package. Thus,
arguably disclosure is just one example of the expectation the general public
receives in return for the correlative obligation not to infringe.168 In return for the
sufferance of the imposed correlative obligation, Bentham notes that the public as
“unassignable individuals” acquire broad returns such as that from the
disclosure.169
B. Justifications for the Rights
Having discussed the nature of rights, this section examines the reason for
conferring such rights and possible reasons for the societal tolerance of the
correlative obligation. Thus, this section examines each of the justifications for the
correlative obligation, including the law of contracts.
The first of these reasons is perhaps a sense of generosity which provides a
simple enough explanation. Unfortunately, it is unlikely to be the reason for the
legal obligations tailored to benefit the right holder. If mankind uniformly had such
a strong sense of generosity, or any other public interest based reason to promote
163

Id. at 185.
Id.
165
Id. at 169.
166
See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 112.
167
Id.
168
Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 545, 594-95 (2012) (highlighting that the disclosure requirements can convey benefits
conducive to the objectives of the patent system).
169
See ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 148, at 175.
164
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innovation without any expectation to itself, arguably there would be no need for
rules.170 David Hume, in The Book of Morals, asserts, “Men being naturally selfish,
or endow[e]d only with a confin[e]d generosity, they are not easily induc[e]d to
perform any action for the interest of strangers, except with a view to some
reciprocal advantage, which they had no hope of obtaining but by such a
performance.”171 Hume adds that “[it is] only from the selfishness and confin[e]d
generosity of men, along with the scanty provision nature has made for his wants,
that justice derives its origin.”172 Thus, the question of the benefit to society from
treating patented property as privileged, thereby forbearing from the property
during the term.
A different construct examining the basis of correlative duty is a sense of
individual morality.173 That is, does a sense of moral obligation to not take away
from the inventor what he created provide adequate justification for the society’s
tolerance of the correlative obligation? The interaction between law and morality is
a romanticized aspect of our legal system. Like justice, morality remains elusive,
and hence, provides easy explanations to appreciate normative structures. Thus,
one can justify that moral obligation formed the basis of the legal obligation that
imposes the correlative duty on the society. Yet, a positivist like Hart would assert
that there is no necessary connection between law and morality. 174 Even assuming
there is a connection between law and morality, morals that vest the correlative
obligation on the inventor should also obligate the patent holder to certain duties in
return for legal rights.
A further expansion of the concept of morality – religious morality – also
fails to fully account for the self-imposed correlative duty of the society.175
Religious morality asserts that God ordained labor as a fundamental right of
men.176 This reasoning posits that the creation of monopoly is consistent with the
right to labor except that the king or lawmaker with powers to effectuate a
monopoly also has a duty to ensure that it is duly limited.177 This position is
170
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reflected in the Statute of Monopolies, which notes that monopolies were tolerated
only when they resulted in public good.178
Yet another justification for the patent system is that it meant to vest a
privilege so as to promote the growth of “human capital” – that is, to encourage the
transfer of valuable trade and technologies.179 It is well documented that in
thirteenth-century England, the Crown’s prerogative in granting a monopoly was to
generate more trade or technology and diffuse them into the society. 180 Professor
Drahos, in tracing the historical and philosophical underpinnings of intellectual
property rights including patents, supports the view that patent rights were
considered a strong form of interference with negative liberties, or the right of
others to pursue certain trade.181 This view supports the proposition that the
inventor had an obligation to the society and is well supported by the law of
contracts.
The law of contracts, by imposing a reciprocal corresponding obligation on
the patent holder, can provide a better justification for the correlative obligation in
the context of patent rights. As such, in a bilateral contract, one party’s obligation
is correlative and reciprocal to the obligation of the other. A patent, as a
government grant, repositions society as third-party beneficiaries. Imposing a duty
(corresponding obligation) in exchange for the society’s correlative obligation
would be a functional aspect of the grant. That is, the society has a correlative duty
not to infringe the patent in return for which the patent owner has a corresponding
duty to the society which includes, but is not limited to, the disclosure. Hence, the
inventor, in exchange for the grant, may be charged with obligations benefitting
the society. Under these circumstances, the third party, presumably the public in
the context of a patent, while being the direct beneficiary lacks the legal right to
enforce the contract should a breach detrimentally affect him. The right correlative
to the obligation, under these circumstances, is held by the party having the control
over the correlative obligation. In effect, the society will have the correlative
obligation not to infringe the patent, the government will have control over the
obligation, and in exchange, the patent holder will be subject to the corresponding
178
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obligation to secure public benefit objectives. This view justifies governmental
interferences in the form of, say, a compulsory license, when there is a problem
affecting the flow of benefit to the society.
The contract-oriented view finds support in writings of H.L.A Hart, who, in
alluding to Bentham’s conception of the law of contracts, differentiates the
imposition of duty under the law of contract as being “‘incomplete’ in a more
radical way than the law underlying the institution of property.” 182 Part of the
reason for the incomplete status is that under the law of contracts, acts that fall
within the determination of the duty paradigm are left undefined. Hart suggests that
“this open area may be restricted in a greater or lesser degree by the law’s insertion
of compulsory clauses into contracts, or by its refusal to recognize the validity of
certain types of agreement.”183 Thus, general law can provide for certain
compulsory restrictions on rights under certain circumstances, or government as
the grantor and the control holder can insert regulations of varying degrees, which
is not new to modern intellectual property systems. Using contracts as a
mechanism would bind the inventor to a corresponding obligation in return for the
rights. Thus, the inventor would be subject to the exercise of the power of
imperation – that is, the power to ensure that individuals act in conformity with a
command.184 Imperative theory has its basis on the power of legislative and
administrative bodies to create rules and regulations that result in increased
effectiveness or efficiencies. Extending the analogy to patents, imperative theory
would conceive of patents as providing exclusive rights granted under a contract
wherein the rights may be limited to achieve the public benefit goals of the system.
Under the patent regime, access to the invention for the public typically
begins when the patent term is over. But the correlative duty of forbearance from
the property, termed as “enforced service,” begins immediately after the rights are
acquired.185 Considering this, treating disclosures as the unique goal in exchange
for patent rights does not account for the imposed correlative obligation during the
patent term. Further, if societal access to the invention through disclosures were
the only goal, they can be effectively generated using other mechanisms, such as a
one-time prize, which can also ensure faster societal access to the innovation.

182

ESSAYS ON BENTHAM, supra note 148, at 209.
Id. at 209.
184
Id. at 201.
185
Id. at 168.
183

2016]

CORRELATIVE OBLIGATION IN PATENT LAW

82

C. Patent Law from the Rights & Duties Framework
This section provides a framework for rights and duties in the context of
patent exclusivity to appreciate the public benefit objectives of the patent system.
The bundle of rights awarded with the grant of a patent can be condensed into
offshoots of the negative exclusionary rights. That is, the patent holder’s right is
limited to excluding others from commercially exploiting the invention without a
license. These negative rights contrast with the affirmative rights for a property
owner to use and enjoy her property. The affirmative right to use one’s property
gives rise to the property owner’s right to exclude others,186 as exclusion is
important to the owner’s use and enjoyment of the property.187 The patent regime’s
focus on negative rights is different from the real property regime, but is closer to
the contractual grant. Unlike real property, patents are nonrivalrous, and thus one
does not need an exclusive right as a functional necessity to practice the invention
in the same way that a property owner needs an exclusive right to enjoy her
property. That is, the inventor can continue to use and practice the invention even
without the exclusive rights. Exclusivity does not vest any additional rights to use
the patented invention. Hence, it becomes important to appreciate the role and
characteristics of exclusivity in patents in order to appreciate the objectives for
granting it.
Unlike in property law, where property rights are granted for facilitating
possession of property, the rights of the patent owner are not awarded to facilitate
possession of the invention. Patent rights are subject to traversing certain minimum
thresholds of inventiveness, and are acquired after careful examination by the
patent office. Possession can be inconsequential to patent law. Further, not all
innovations and new ideas are granted patents. A novel invention can still fail to
acquire the associated bundle of rights by being subject to a statutory bar,188 lack of
inventive genius, or other grounds for invalidity. Unlike in real property, where
interference with ownership alone is sufficient to establish trespass, in patent law,
186
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the determination of infringement requires proof of both ownership and validity.
This sets patents apart from other forms of property.
Theoretically, every form of property (which includes the physical and the
technological) would have a value (base worth) assuming there is free competition
and no protection. Such base worth is the value of the property or the product
covering the physical property and the technology, but without the privilege of
exclusivity. The factum of exclusivity (or, relatedly, fencing of the property) can
operate to impose an artificially higher market value on account of the artificial
scarcity, but the minimum value or base worth should remain the same
notwithstanding the presence of exclusivity. There is truly no reason to suspect that
falling into the public domain would alter the property value, at least until there are
substitutes in the market. In reality, unfenced land per se can be equally valuable
as fenced land in the market, as is true with inventive ideas. And an inventor who
lets the invention into the public domain should be able to generate a minimum
value equivalent to the base worth, at least until the invention is replicated or
recreated.189 Given this, the rights associated with patents operate to create a zone
of protection for the property with a view to prevent encroachment from third
parties.
The above narrative posits exclusivity as a non-functional aspect of the
grant. In doing so, it raises a fundamental question with respect to the correlative
duty that such exclusivity imposes on the rest of the world. The term ‘correlative
duty’ is used along the same lines as in property law where the grant of a right
correlates to a duty of forbearance on others. But neither disclosure nor incentive
to innovate fully explain the reason for society taking on the correlative obligation
of forbearance from the property during the term. If disclosure from the
specification was the only ultimate goal, such disclosure could be better achieved
in many cases by simply letting the invention fall in the public domain without
vesting the exclusive rights that are now associated with it. If incentive to innovate
instead were the only goal, this objective could be served by mechanisms such as a
prize, which is usually a more risk free one-time reward or recognition in
celebration of the invention.190 Exclusivity entails more than a prize or a reward,
189
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although mechanisms like awards and prizes can also be effective to further the
objective of encouraging creativity.191
Specifically, a system styled to monetize the technological benefits of an
invention could capture most of the functional value of exclusivity and may even
eliminate some of the associated dangers. Even without patents, an invention that
is successful in the market can incentivize competition. Inventions protected by
trade secrets increase competition by reverse engineering or substitution. Such
competition, in turn, incentivizes the original creator to continue capturing the
benefits of lead-time advantages. Thus, patent incentives may be redundant in
some circumstances because innovators may be motivated by market profits even
without patent incentives. Considering this, the societal preference for the patent
system at the cost of the forbearance duties leads to a conclusion that, save for the
clear public benefit paradigm, there is limited justification for the society’s selfimposition of a duty.
In considering the framework for rights and duties in patent law, a balance
between rights and duties is important for the patent system to benefit the public.
On the one hand, a patent regime that bears a low threshold for patentability may
result in a large number of patents, likely to the detriment of the public domain.
While such a system is likely to generate many patents, some with limited
inventiveness, the value of each individual patent is likely to be limited by the
lower levels of inventiveness barring exceptional circumstances. Also, the low
inventiveness threshold makes it easier to find competing substitutes in the
marketplace. Soon, as each of the patent holders embodying a low threshold of
inventiveness compete, they will alter the norms relative to the others resulting in a
rivalrous effect. Alternatively, each patent may be dependent on other patents or
would have to be bundled together in order to generate adequate market value.
Each such patent holder’s exclusivity will be circumscribed by other patents. The
best example of the above problem of low-value patents can be found in the
(2014); Marlynn Wei, Should Prize Replace Patents? A Critique of the Medical Innovation Prize
Act of 2005, 13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 25, 27-28 (2007).
191
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-inequality/ (“[T]here are alternatives. Advocates of intellectual property rights have
overemphasized their role in promoting innovation. Most of the key innovations — from the
basic ideas underlying the computer, to transistors, to lasers, to the discovery of DNA — were
not motivated by pecuniary gain. They were motivated by the quest for knowledge.”).
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software industry.192 As the number of patents on comparable and substitutable
technology increases, there is an increasing tendency of corporations to accumulate
software patents to create a portfolio.193 That is, patent holders consolidate their
property to maximize the benefits. This results in several patents with lower levels
of inventiveness representing a potent business tool rather than pockets of
innovation.
Under conditions detailed above, the value from each patent (or set thereof)
is best generated when they are pooled together. Such consolidation can also have
the benefit of minimizing litigations between holders of patents on comparable
technologies. Thus, the trend today is to acquire a patent family, which is
comprised of multiple patents that ultimately protect the same invention.194 Within
patent families each single patent may have limited value, but together as a patent
family, they increase the bargaining parity of the patent holder.195 In the
telecommunication and mobile phone technology business, for example, Samsung
is understood to hold about 31,524 patent families, Microsoft holds about 8,887,
and Apple holds about 1,941.196 Under these conditions, the market value of any
192
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one single invention is limited, and each patent holder’s exclusivity is
circumscribed by other patents. Each individual patent embodies limited
inventiveness because of the low thresholds for protection that prevails in the first
place. These conditions incentivize a larger number of arguably weaker patents.
However, the system produces patent portfolios that affect the public
detrimentally in many important ways.197 For example, recent studies have
concluded that patent consolidation – grouping patents in “thickets” – increases
transaction costs, reduces profits that derive from the commercialization of
innovation and ultimately reduces incentives to innovate.198 The resources required
to create a portfolio and the consequential increase in bargaining parity of the
portfolio owner increase the entry barrier, reduce competition in the market, and
can affect small investors disproportionately.199 The resulting inefficiencies affect
the public detrimentally because patent protection is bestowed for materials with
limited innovation.200 In turn, the system results in allocating more power,
sometimes unfairly, to holders of large patent portfolios.
A system that rewards innovations with a lower threshold of inventiveness
can result in accumulating more but can also erode the incentive for inventors to
reach their maximum creative potential, or worse, can create costs that result in
blocking follow-on innovations. The protection for minor innovations increases the
overall need for licensing fees, further impeding innovation. Such a system is a
detriment to the public domain. Under such circumstances, the incentive of
exclusive rights in reality becomes a burden on the public, preventing access to
what might have been otherwise available and accessible to the public. Thus,
overall, a system that facilitates low threshold of patentability may frustrate the
purpose of incentivizing invention. Along the same lines, largess in the rights
package can prevent the system from achieving the targeted objective of
197
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incentivizing invention. Under these circumstances, the enormity of the rights
package can lead to societal discontent with the system.201
Conversely, a legal system that confers limited power on the patent holder
may be able to promote access to knowledge and innovation, even though it may
not be able to capture all innovations under the private domain. The patent systems
of several developing countries before the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement
provide good examples.202 Indian patent law allowed only process patents for
pharmaceutical innovations with a view to improve competition. The process
patent regime encouraged innovation in different methods of manufacturing known
pharmaceutical products. This regime resulted in creating competing but similar
products, increasing competition and thus making the product more accessible.203
Process innovations became the critical first step for the genesis and growth of the
Indian pharmaceutical industry. Similarly, a rule prohibiting product patents for
chemicals was first introduced in the German Patent Law of 1877 to stimulate
research in alternative methods of producing a product.204 Within thirty years of
enacting this rule, the German chemical industry became a European leader.205
German scientists and research workers attributed the success to the various
process innovations that promoted competition. Interestingly, research in Germany
attributed the failure of the French chemical industry to the product patent
system.206 Importantly, providing exclusive rights to the process of production was
considered a valuable inducement to the discovery of alternative processes.207 The
resulting increase in diversity of the products benefited consumers. Although
regimes with only process protection for pharmaceutical drugs have typically been
201
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faulted for having lesser rights, they should not be confused as lacking in
innovation.208
For the patent system to be most efficient, the system should create a balance
between rights and obligation.209 As Waldron asserts, “[t]o say that rights are a
means to an end is one thing; but the correlative proposition that some should be
forced to bear sacrifices for the greater social good smacks dangerously of
throwing Christians to the lions for the delectation of Roman society.” 210 Justice
Breyer captured this sentiment in Mayo v. Prometheus, opining,
[p]atent protection is, after all, a two-edged sword. On the one hand,
the promise of exclusive rights provides monetary incentives that lead
to creation, invention, and discovery. On the other hand, that very
exclusivity can impede the flow of information that might permit,
indeed spur, invention, by, for example, raising the price of using the
patented ideas once created, requiring potential users to conduct costly
and time-consuming searches of existing patents and pending patent
applications, and requiring the negotiation of complex licensing
arrangements.211
Reverberating similar sentiments, Justice Thomas in Myriad emphasized the
importance of striking a “delicate balance between creating incentives that lead to
creation, invention, and discovery and impeding the flow of information that might
permit, indeed spur, invention.”212 Ghosh perhaps couches this concept with more
precision when he asserts,
While current intellectual property law assumes the primacy of the
rights of owners (emphasizing the attachment to legal ownership),
nuanced consequentialism would recognize the place of the
intellectual property owner in a network of relationships which create
duties and obligations. Sensitivity to the consequences of intellectual
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property rights is, to quote Professor Sen, sensitive ‘to agencies and
relations in evaluating what is happening in the world.’213
CONCLUSION
This paper attempts to capture the intrinsic core of patent law’s structure as
delineated in historical sources in an unorthodox manner. It asserts that patent law
is a misfit within the traditional property regime. While patent law seems to
struggle to define the outer limits of patent exclusivity, the paper shows how the
current levels of exclusivity seem to lack support from the doctrinal construct of
the philosophy behind exclusivity. In doing so, the paper highlights the source of
exclusive rights to examine how a disconnect between the instrumental elements of
patents and its targeted objectives has developed over time, leading to a rightscentric patent system. Understanding the objectives of the system is important for
patent law to achieve its constitutional destiny. The paper does not propose a
comprehensive theory of patent law. Instead, it presents the law of contracts as
embodying a framework within which patent law can fit better. The paper
concludes that patent law needs a more balanced approach to ensure that the rights
and obligations inherent to the system work to achieve the targeted objectives.
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